

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02

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PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 /083 W

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O R 261810Z JUN 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1081

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0314

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DRAFT GUIDANCE ON OPTION III

REF: STATE 149343

1. WE AGREE THAT SPC CONSIDERATION OF OPTION III SHOULD  
FOCUS ON DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AHG-  
PROVIDED REFTEL. HOWEVER, IT IS APPARENT FROM THE FIRST  
ROUND OF SPC DISCUSSION ON THE US VIEWS PAPER THAT IT WILL  
ALSO BE NECESSARY, AS A SUPPLEMENT, TO DEVELOP A SEPARATE  
PAPER RECORDING INTERNAL ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDINGS ON KEY  
ASPECTS OF OPTION III (PARTICULARLY, THE QUESTION OF LIMITA-  
TIONS ON ARMAMENTS RESULTING FROM OPTION III), IF WE ARE TO  
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OBTAIN AN ALLIED CONSENSUS ON PROCEEDING WITH OPTION III.

THE GERMANS, FOR ONE, HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL INSIST ON SUCH A PAPER, AND US REPS AT THE SPC DISCUSSIONS JUNE 23-24 INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING SUCH A PAPER.

2. WE HAVE DRAFTED, FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION, A PAPER CONTAINING THE MINIMUM INTERNAL ALLIED UNDERTAKINGS WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE REQUIRED TO SECURE ALLIED AGREEMENT TO OPTION III. OUR DRAFT DRAWS HEAVILY ON LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE US VIEWS PAPER. IT IS DESIGNED TO SUPPLEMENT THE DRAFT GUIDANCE; IT CONFORMS TO THE MATERIAL IN THE DRAFT GUIDANCE, WHILE AVOIDING DUPLICATION.

3. WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON APPROVE OUR DRAFT PAPER FOR TABLING AS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT, FOR PURPOSES OF DISCUSSION AND SUBJECT TO LATER US AMENDMENT, AS SOON AS IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A PAPER WILL FACILITATE SPC AGREEMENT ON THE DRAFT GUIDANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT IN SECURING REASONABLY EXPEDITIOUS ALLIED APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR THE US TO BE AS PROMPT AND FORTHCOMING IN MEETING ALLIED CONCERNS AS POSSIBLE AS A DEMONSTRATION OF OUR GOOD FAITH. WE BELIEVE OUR PAPER ADDRESSES THE SUBSTANTIVE GERMAN CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN THE GERMAN SPEAKING NOTES USED IN THE SPC MEETING ON JUNE 23 (USNATO 3397). OUR SUGGESTED PAPER WOULD, WE BELIEVE, SERVE AS AN EFFECTIVE VEHICLE FOR TIMELY GERMAN DECISION MAKING.

4. MOST OF THE OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY VARIOUS ALLIES IN THE JUNE 23-24 SPC MEETINGS ARE DEALT WITH EITHER IN OUR SUGGESTED PAPER OR IN THE DRAFT GUIDANCE ITSELF. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, DELIBERATELY AVOIDED ADDRESSING A FEW ISSUES WHERE WE BELIEVE EITHER THAT FURTHER WASHINGTON STUDY WILL BE REQUIRED (THE RESULTS OF WHICH COULD BE FED INTO THE SPC DISCUSSION AT A LATER POINT) OR WHERE WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD AVOID A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO ITS ALLIES.

5. THESE ISSUES ARE:

A. WHETHER SOME QRA AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REDUCED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF 54 US F-4'S. WE BELIEVE THIS ISSUE REQUIRES WASHINGTON STUDY.

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B. RETURN TIMES OF US AIRCRAFT WITHDRAWN UNDER OPTION III. THIS ISSUE ALSO REQUIRES WASHINGTON STUDY.

C. PRECEDENT-SETTING EFFECT OF OPTION III FOR PHASE II.

D. PHASING AS AN OBJECTIVE OF OPTION III. THE GERMAN SPEAKING NOTES OF JUNE 23 (US NATO 3397, PARA 6.C.) CALL FOR

ALLIANCE AGREEMENT THAT OPTION III IS INTENDED TO BUY  
EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE PHASING CONCEPT (AS WELL AS THE  
COMMON CEILING AND THE TANK ARMY). WE BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH 2  
OF THE DRAFT NAC GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN STATE 149343 ADEQUATELY  
COVERS THE POINT BY SAYING THAT ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE  
ALLIED POSITION PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST REMAIN UNCHANGED.

E. AVOIDANCE OF RESTRICTIONS ON US ARMAMENTS DEPLOYED  
OUTSIDE THE NGA. CERTAIN ALLIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WISHED  
ASSURANCES THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD NOT RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF  
THE US TO DEPLOY ARMAMENTS ON THEIR TERRITORIES OUTSIDE THE  
AREA OF REDUCTIONS (USNATO 3415, PARA 3). WE HAVE  
DELIBERATELY AVOIDED TREATMENT OF THIS POINT IN OUR SUGGESTED  
PAPER BECAUSE IT RAISES THE ISSUE OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN  
HUNGARY AND THE GENERAL FLANK ISSUE OF INHIBITING MAJOR SOVIET  
REDEPLOYMENTS TO AREAS ADJACENT TO THE NATO FLANKS. THIS  
PROBLEM WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN DUE COURSE, BUT WE  
RECOMMEND AGAINST ATTEMPTING TO ADDRESS IT IN THE FIRST DRAFT  
OF A PAPER FOR SPC DISCUSSION.

F. FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. PARAGRAPH 36 OF THE US VIEWS  
PAPER SAYS THAT "WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR IN THE AGREEMENT THAT  
THE LIMITATION ON EACH REDUCED ELEMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1082

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

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FROM US REP MBFR

QUANTITY OF THAT ELEMENT IN THE AREA, AND IN NO WAY CONSTRAINS QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OR ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT OF CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS WITH FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS." IN OUR SUGGESTED DRAFT, WE HAVE REPHRASED THIS POINT BY SUGGESTING THAT THE ALLIES AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES TO AVOID LIMITATIONS IN AN AGREEMENT OF A TYPE WHICH WOULD INHIBIT ALLIED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PURPOSE CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THIS WAY WITHOUT THE BURDEN OF HAVING TONEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST AN EXPRESS PROVISION COVERING THIS POINT IN AN AGREEMENT. SUCH A PROVISION WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. IT APPEARS PREFERABLE TO US TO ALLOW THE AGREEMENT TO REMAIN SILENT ON THIS POINT, ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHATEVER IS NOT FORBIDDEN BY THE AGREEMENT WILL BE PERMITTED.

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G. "APPROPRIATE DEFINITION" OF THE COMMON CEILING TO BE AGREED IN PHASE I. WE ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE.

6. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF OUR SUGGESTED DRAFT SPC PAPER. ACTION REQUESTED: EARLY WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON OUR RECOMMENDED APPROACH.

BEGIN TEXT:

ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN MBFR

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. THIS PAPER SUPPLEMENTS THE COUNCIL'S GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP AUTHORIZING ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO PROPOSE A REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE ALLIES' PHASE I OBJECTIVES. IT RECORDS INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENTS AS TO ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION.

2. IN REACHING THIS POSITION, THE ALLIES HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF SHAPE EXPRESSED IN (DESIGNATION OF DOCUMENT).

II. LIMITATIONS ON FORCE ELEMENTS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY AGREED

3. MANPOWER. A NUMERICAL LIMITATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, MINUS THE AGREED NUMBER OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL TO BE REDUCED, WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR EXERCISES. THE ALLIES WOULD AGREE TO A LIMITATION ON US GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, MINUS THE AGREED NUMBER OF US GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL TO BE REDUCED, WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR EXERCISES.

4. AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY THE ALLIES, A TEMPORARY LIMITATION OF LIMITED DURATION WOULD BE PLACED ON THE OVERALL AGGREGATE GROUND FORCE  
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MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE  
THE  
NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, MINUS THE AGREED NUMBER OF THE US AND SOVIET PERSONNEL TO BE REDUCED. THE LIMITATION SHOULD RESULT IN NO NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON NON-US NATO FORCES.

5. AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY THE ALLIES, A TEMPORARY LIMITATION OF LIMITED DURATION WOULD BE PLACED ON THE OVERALL AGGREGATE AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS FOR EXERCISES. THE LIMITATION SHOULD RESULT IN NO NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON NON-US NATO FORCES.

6. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE AIR OR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SUBCEILINGS, EITHER IN CONNECTION WITH THE PHASE I NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO BE ACHIEVED IN PHASE II, REMAINS TO BE DECIDED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO THE EAST TO PREJUDICE THIS ISSUE.

7. SOVIET TANKS. SOVIET "MAIN BATTLE TANKS," WOULD BE DEFINED BY THOSE MODELS (E.G., T-54, T-62, T-10) NOW IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE LIMITATION WILL ALSO COVER OTHER MODELS WHOSE CHARACTERISTICS ARE SIMILAR TO THE SPECIFIED MODELS IF AND WHEN SUCH MODELS ENTER THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

8. OTHER EQUIPMENT OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET

TANK ARMY IN MAJOR UNITS INCLUDING THEIR ARMAMENTS, BUT SHOULD REQUIRE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ONLY OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS.

9. US NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE 1,000 WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THOSE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY US UNITS. WITHDRAWALS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH A MANNER THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ALL  
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EMPLOYMENT MODES. THE TYPES AND NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF WARHEAD TO BE WITHDRAWN WILL NOT BE SPECIFIED TO THE EAST. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD DESCRIBE WARHEAD LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF "US NUCLEAR WARHEADS" AND AVOID ANY LIMIT ON SPECIFIC SUBTYPES IN ORDER TO RETAIN FREEDOM TO MIX AMONG WARHEAD TYPES.

10. US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS. (LIMITATION AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF GUIDANCE.)

11. US NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. THE ALLIES WILL AVOID ANY LIMITATION ON US CONVENTIONAL (I.E., NON-NUCLEAR)

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1083

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COMBAT AIRCRAFT. IN RESPONSE TO EXPECTED SOVIET DEMANDS FOR A LIMITATION ON ALL US COMBAT AIRCRAFT REMAINING IN THE AREA, THE ALLIES WOULD RESPOND THAT THE OFFER TO WITHDRAW US AIRCRAFT WAS LIMITED TO "US NUCLEAR-CABLE AIRCRAFT", WHICH WOULD BE DEFINED TO BE ALL AIRCRAFT OF SPECIFIED MODELS (I.E., F4-C, F4-D, F4-E) IN THE AREA, IF AT LEAST SOME AIRCRAFT OF THAT MODEL ARE PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING A NUCLEAR WEAPON WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. THE ALLIES WOULD WANT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD TO REFLECT IN SOME WAY THE MODELS COVERED BY THE LIMITATION. THIS COULD BE IN THE FORM OF A LIST OF MODELS WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE ARE COVERED OR IT COULD TAKE SOME OTHER FORM. THE LIMIT ON US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE A LIMIT ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF SUCH AIRCRAFT IN SECRET

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THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO SUB-CEILINGS ON PARTICULAR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS.

12. FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID ANY PROVISIONS IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INHIBIT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OR ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT OF CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS WITH FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS.

13. LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE WITHDRAWN BY THE US. (SEE PARAGRAPH 5 OF DRAFT AHG GUIDANCE.)

IV. LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS

14. ANY LIMITS ON US TANKS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO MAIN BATTLE TANKS WHICH WOULD BE DEFINED BY THOSE MODELS (E.G., M60, M60A1, M60A2) NOW IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION.

V. LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS OF NON-US NATO AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES

15. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AVOID ANY COMMITMENT TO LIMITS ON NON-US ARMAMENTS. BECAUSE OF THE GREATER IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING LIMITATIONS ON NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT SEEK LIMITATIONS OR NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT ARMAMENTS.

VI. AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS

16. THE ALLIES MAY ULTIMATELY WANT TO PERMIT LIMITED US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I TO ALLOW THE ALLIES TO TAKE "CREDIT" FOR US AIRMENT WHO MAY BE WITHDRAWN WITH THE US F-4 AIRCRAFT IN OPTION III. THE ALLIES DO NOT WANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AT THIS TIME TO ANY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OR ENGAGE THE EAST ON THIS TOPIC UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED A CONSIDERED EASTERN REACTION TO THE OPTION III PROPOSAL. IF ANY US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ARE ULTIMATELY AGREED TO IN PHASE I THEY WOULD:

-- BE ON A STRICTLY VOLUNTARY BASIS (MINIMIZING ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II);

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-- BE LIMITED TO A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REDUCTIONS (SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES REDUCTIONS);

-- NOT REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THE PRESENT LEVEL OF US TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA (EXCEPT FOR THE F-4'S INCLUDED IN OPTION III). END TEXT.RESOR

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